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 Internet of things (IoT) has described a futurevision of internetwhere users, 
computing system, and everyday objects possessing sensing and actuating 
capabilities are part of distributed applications and required to support 
standard internet communication with more powerful device or internet 
hosts. This vision necessitates the security mechanisms for end-to-end 
communication. A key management protocol is critical to ensuring the secure 
exchange of data between interconnecting entities, but due to the nature of 
this communication system where a high resource constrained node may be 
communicating with node with high energy makes the application of existing 
key management protocols impossible. In this paper, we propose a new 
lightweight key management protocol that allows the constrained node in 
6loWPAN network to transmit captured data to internet host in secure 
channel. This protocol is based on cooperation of selected 6loWPAN routers 
to participate in computation of highly consuming cryptographic primitives. 
Our protocol is assessed with AVISPA tool, the results show that our scheme 
ensured security properties. 
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The internet of things has made a revolution in the world of communication by connected the 
physical objects to Internet. According to [1] (IoT) is a concept and a paradigm that considers pervasive 
presence in the environment of a variety of things/objects that through wireless and wired connections and 
unique addressing schemes are able to interact with each other and cooperate with other things/objects to 
create new applications/services. 
The internet of things (IoT)  describes the next generation of Internet, where the physical  things or 
objects are connected, accessed and  identified  through  the Internet, many technologies are involved in IoT, 
such as WSN (Wireless Sensors network) [2], intelligent sensing, Radio Frequency Identification  (RFID) 
[3], 6LoWPAN [4], Near Field communications (NFC) [5] [6], low energy wireless communication , cloud 
computing, and so on. 
These technologies will interact with physical phenomena by employing more constrained sensing 
platforms and low-energy wireless communications, therefore, end-to-end communication between 
constrained sensing devices and other Internet host will be a fundamental requirement of many sensing 
application using these technologies, this aspects that seriously complicate the design and adoption of 
appropriate security mechanisms especially end-to-end security mechanisms.  
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In the literature, several research efforts have been introduced to overcome challenges and find 
appropriate solutions associated to security especially end-to-end security. Some research have focused  their 
efforts to making the security protocol standards suitable to the context of IoT as Hummen et  al  in [7], have 
developed a complementary lightweight full extension to HIP DEX (Host Identity  Protocol Diet Exchange) 
standard for working with the IoT architecture specification ,this extension could be generalized to DTLS 
protocol and IKE. Other research as Granjal et al in [8], have proposed a procedure of delegation of large 
computation in DTLS protocol to a rich resource entity, Also Oleveau and Said in [9] have presented a 
distributed HIP (D-HIP) inspired from HIP-BEX, They are used proxies nodes to calculate the DH protocol 
of operations for session key establishment, each  proxy node takes a calculation part. 
Another vision of solution have been introduced, it is the proposal of compression schemes applied 
to different protocols. In [10, 11], the authors have proposed IPV6 header compression, extension headers, 
and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) header standardized through 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low power Wireless 
Personal Area Networks). Authors in [12, 13] have presented 6LoWPAN compressions for IPsec payload 
headers: AH (Authentication Header) and ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload). Raza et al. [14] have 
proposed a modification of DTLS headers using the 6LoWPAN compression scheme. The modified protocol 
reduces the size of some headers (i.e. the DTLS record header, the handshake header, the handshake 
message). 
So many works focus on the adaptation of existing security solutions to the specification related to 
IoT environment, our work provides a suitable key management protocol for IoT scenarios. In this paper, we 
propose a new lightweight key management protocol which is based on cooperation between selected routers 
in 6loWPAN network to establish a secured communication channel between a highly resource constrained 
node in 6loWPAN network and a remote entity (i.e. server). In our protocol, the third parties (routers) have a 
more active role through   taking responsibility to computation of the highly consuming cryptographic 
primitives. We have assessed our protocol using AVISPA tool, the obtained results shows that our protocol is 
safe in terms of security properties. Our paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we explain the research 
method. The result and discussion are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
In this section, we presente our lightweight end-to-end key management protocol. Firstly, we give a 
brief overview on 6LoWPAN network. Then, wepresente the proposed network model and set of 
assumptions. Afterwards, we describe our proposed protocol. Finaly we explaine in detail the different 
phases of our model along with a summary of the notations used throughout the paper. 
 
2.1. 6loWPAN Network 
6LoWPAN is connecting more things to the cloud. Low-power, IP-driven nodes and large mesh 
network support make this technology a great option for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. According to 
[15] a LoWPAN is Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks (LoWPANs) composed of devices 
conforming to the IEEE 802.15.4-2003 standard defined by the IEEE [16]. IEEE 802.15.4 devices are 
characterized by short range, low bit rate (from 20 Kbits/s (868 MHz) to 250 Kbits/s (2.45 GHz)), Small 
packet size (the maximum transmission unit or MTU on IEEE 802.15.4 links is 127 bytes), low power, and 
low cost. 
The IPv6 over Low-power WPAN (6LowWPAN) Working Group was formed in 2004 to work on 
protocol specifications to optimize the operation of IPv6 over networks made of IEEE 802.15.4 links in 
LoWPAN (Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks), it was decided to exclusively work on the 
required IPv6 protocol extensions for LoWPAN (such as fragmentation and reassembly, header compression, 
neighbor discovery adaptation, etc.). The 6LoWPAN Working Group belongs to the Internet area (INT) of 
the IETF[17] ,Then the Routing Over Low-power and Lossy network (ROLL) Working Group was formed to 
deal with routing issues in networks with similar characteristics at the IP layer thus alleviating the restriction 
of using IEEE 802.15.4 links, since by definition routing operates at the network layer. IPv6 based Wireless 
sensor network can be considered as one enabling wireless technologies that offers greater advantage for the 
advancement of M2M communication. 
The 6LoWPAN network is connected to the IPv6 network using an edge router. The edge router 
handles three actions: 
- The data exchange between 6LoWPAN devices and the Internet (or other IPv6 network). 
- Local data exchange between devices inside the 6LoWPAN.  
- The generation and maintenance of the radio subnet (the 6LoWPAN network). 
The 6LoWPAN networks are connected to other networks simply using IP routers. As shown in 
Figure 1, the edge router is considered like stub network. This means data going into the network is destined 
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for one of the devices inside the 6LoWPAN. 6loWPAN device may be connected to the internet host in other 





Figure 1. Connected 6LoWPAN network with IPV6 network 
 
 
Connectivity to other IP networks may be provided through any arbitrary link, such as Ethernet, WI-
Fi or 3G/4G. In the Typical 6loWPAN network there are two other device types: routers and hosts. Routers 
can, as the name implies, route data destined to another node in the 6LoWPAN network. Hosts are not able to 
route data to other devices in the network. The host can also be a sleepy device, waking up periodically to 
check its parent (a router) for data, enabling very low power consumption. 
The basic concept of 6LoWPAN stack is illustrated in Figure 2. 6LoWPAN is an adaptation layer is 
added between the network and IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer. This layer is responsible to establish 6loWPAN 









2.2. Network Model and Assumptions 
In this work, the architecture shown in Figure 3 is considered. It consists of two parties, the first part 
















































Application Layer (COAP) 
Transport Layer (UDP) 
 
Network Layer (IPv6) (RPL) 
6LoWPAN Adaptions Layer 
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC 
IEEE 802.15.4 PHY 
IJECE ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
Efficient End-to-End Secure Key Management Protocol for Internet of Things (Yamina Ben Slimane) 
3625 
network, the second part consists of the remote server (RS) in IPV6 network, furthermore another component 
plays role in our architecture is the Certification authority  server(CA) delivers authenticated certificates. The 
Access Control (AC) server supports authentication and trust operation in 6loWPAN network and also 
possess a trust relationship with a remote server, 6LBR can serve as a gateway to the 6loWPAN nodes while 




Figure 3. Network Model 
 
 
In this architecture, it is assumed that all nodes that are registered to the 6LBR are motionless. The 
selected 6LoWPAN routers (Ri) are equipped with sufficient computation and storage capabilities than the 
6loWPAN host (H). During initial bootstrapping network, the security keys (which are refreshed 
periodically) are distributed to all nodes by The Access Control (AC) server. In this network we distinguish 
two types of nodes in term of storage capacities, computing power and energy resources: 
The first, highly resource constrained node (6LoWPAN host (H)), which are unable to perform 
public key cryptographic operations. The second Node with high capabilities of storage, energy and 
computing power (the selected 6loWPAN routers (Ri) and the remote server (RS)). 
 
2.3. Description of Our Proposed Protocol 
While guaranteeing E2E security between a 6loWPAN host (H) and a remote server, we establish a 
shared key between the two ends of communication, for achieve this goal, a key exchange protocol is 
required between the two entities to secure these communications. In this section, we provide an overview 
over steps of our protocol. Firstly , the 6loWPAN host(H) is willing establish a shared secret key with remote 
server ,it initiates our protocol, the 6loWPAN host (H) generates a secret key (using one of  the appropriate 
methods  for  resource constrained node) which is then randomly split  to several secret parts, however this 
steps is performed after an authentication procedure between a 6loWPAN host (H) and each 6loWPAN 
routers (Ri). Each part of  the secret key is encrypted and  sent to corresponding 6loWPAN router (Ri) by 
6loWPAN host(H), this latter use symmetric algorithm  based shared key for encryption and MAC (message 
authentication code) to ensure authentication. Once the 6loWPAN router (Ri) receives  its corresponding part 
of the secret key, it decrypts the message then the 6loWPAN router (Ri) encrypts the same message using  
public key encryption and send it to the remote server, the authentication between the 6loWPAN routers and 
remote server ensures with digital signature. After receiving all the part of secret key by the remote server, it 
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2.4. Notations and Formal Description 
During an initialization phase, the resource-constrained 6loWPAN host (H) carefully selects the 
R1,…..,Rm that will assist its key exchange, this operation is realized between the H and 6LBR where this 
latter delivers to H  the selected 6loWPAN routers (Ri)’s identifiers (IDs), the 6LBR relies on the model of 
trust management for  selection of 6loWPAN routers. Table 1. Summarizes the notations used to present the 
exchanged messages, and Figure 4 illustrate the succeeding steps of our protocol. 
 
 
Table 1. The notations used in exchanged messages 
Notation Description 
H 6LoWPAN Host 
Ri I
th6LoWPAN Router 
AC Access Control Server 
RS Remote Server 
CA Certification Authority 
NX Nonce generated by node X 
KX-Y Shared pairwise key between X and Y 
Kpublic-X Public key of node X 
(message)K Message encrypted with the key K 
SignX X’s digital signature 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
Ki Part of secret Key K 
K Secret Key K 
CertX X’s Certificate delivered by CA 
lifetimeX X’s Key lifetime 
Ticket Ri (H, Ri ,KH−Ri, lifetimeRi,CertRi,NH) 
 
 
Steps 1: 6loWPAN host(H) initiates the protocol by sending a Hello_H message to remote server 
(RS). This message contains the security policies associated to the 6loWPAN host (H) like encryption 
algorithms, lifetime, and compression methods. etc. the RS responses with Hello_RS message where it 
selects appropriates algorithms. The exchanged messages include the nonce to protect against replay 
message. 
Steps 2: when the connection between the 6loWPAN host (H) and the remote server is succeed, the 
6loWPAN host (H) requests AC server to obtain the security-related information’s for 6loWPAN routers (Ri) 
involved. The request message identifies the 6loWPAN routers (Ri) and 6loWPAN host (H), while also 
including a nonce. This message is encrypted with pre-shared key KH-AC. The AC server responses with the 
encrypted message contain the secret shared key KH−Ri  between H and Ri plus 6loWPAN host (H)’s ID and 
the nonce. Also the AC builds an authentication model contains the security information about Ri (TicketRi) 
and sends it together with a token containing the identification and a nonce of 6loWPAN host (H) to each 
6loWPAN router Ri. When each 6loWPAN router (Ri) receives this message, it compares the information 
contained in the two tokens received in order to authenticate the host (H). In the case of successful 
authentication, each 6loWPAN router (Ri) is possess the shared secret key KH−Ri. The reply message is 
encrypted with this key and carries to 6lowpan Host (H) with nonce. 
Step 3: if step 2 is succeed , now the 6loWPAN host(H) sends the message witch informs each 
6loWPAN router(Ri) about remote server identity , this message contains the RS’s ID and  encrypted with 
 KH−Ri, plus a Message Authentication Code. After Ri received the message, it provides the RS with their 
certificate containing its public key (delivered by CA). In addition, it requests the certificate of RS. In the 
response of this message, RS sends require information. The Nonce is also included in the exchanged 
messages to prevent replay attacks.  
Step 4:  in this step, the 6loWPAN host (H) generates the secret Key K which will be used later to 
generate further keying materials at both H and RS sides. The secret is split into K1, K2,……Km parts . Each 
part Ki is encrypted with symmetric methods and securely sent with MAC to the appropriate 6loWPAN 
router (Ri) in  the message .At the level of each 6loWPAN router Ri, each Ri uses RS’s public key to encrypt 
message. This message contains the secret part Ki and Ri’s signature. RS verifies the authenticity of each 
message using Ri’s public key. If all the messages are received and authenticated succefully, then RS 
reconstructs the secret K. This secret along with the previous exchanged nonce are used to derive further key 
credentials.  The nonces are included in the messages. 
Step 5: this step terminates the exchanges message by proving to H the knowledge of the secret K. 
The derivation process is ensured by a hash function agreed upon during the first step. Both parties are then 
able to derive state connection keys for encryption and authentication of the exchanged data.  
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Figure 4. Illustration of the different steps and message exchanges of our protocol 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of our proposed key management protocol in terms of 
security propertiesthen we presente the validation of our protocol using  avispa  tool  and compares  the 
performance of our model with others research in literature. 
 
3.1 Security Analysis 
Our analysis is based on security properties of security protocols in IoT presented in [18] [19]. For 
the following discussion, we consider that our communication channel divides into two segments (explained 
in figure 3): 
 Confidentiality: the confidentiality of exchange messages in our protocol is realized in two segments. 
For seg1, the symmetric encryption is effectuated with the set of pre-shared keys delivered from the 
trusted access server AC. we prefer the choose for encryption algorithms the AES-CCM mode that 
defines AES-CBC for MAC generation with AES-CTR for encryption [20]. For seg 2, the asymmetric 
encryption with public key is used for ensuring the security communication between entities. We 
recommend the use ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman exchange). The CA delivers the required 
certificates to the involved entities. Our protocol can be run periodically to update the established keys in 
order to strengthen confidentiality, and prevent long term attacks 
 Integrity: through the use of MAC (Message Authentication Code) [21] in exchanged messages in seg1, 
the data have not been altered. The same aim is ensured in seg2 by using the digital signatures, 
 Authentication and Authorization: the AC server assures the authentication of the components in 
6loWPAN domain and possesses a trusted relationship with the remote server. 
 Freshness: to avoid any replay attacks, we include nonce in the different exchanged messages. 
 Extensibility and scalability: in our model, it is easy to integrate a new sensor. This later receives a pre-
shared key with access control server during its bootstrapping phase in network.Then, it pass through an 
initialization phase and receive a selected 6lowpan routers’ IDs that their participated in its key exchange 
protocol.  
The 6LoWPAN network is vulnerable from many kinds of attack like replay attack, DDos attack, 
sinkhole attack, wormhole attack, rank attack, etc. Our protocol possess  a mechanisms that protect the 
network from  the effect of these attacks, for replay attack , we have implemented the mechanisms  of the 
nonce in different exchange messages and the mechanisms of MAC that prevent modification, alteration, 
H Ri AC RS 
HELLO_H (𝑵𝐇, Security Policy) 
 HELLO_RS (𝑵𝐑𝐒, Security Policy) 
∀i∈ {1,..,m} (𝑹𝒊, H, 𝐍𝑯)_𝑲𝑯−𝑨𝑪 
 
∀i∈ {1,..,m} (H,𝑲𝑯−𝑹𝒊, 
𝐍𝑯)_𝑲𝑯−𝑨𝑪 
∀i∈ {1,..,m} ((𝑻𝒊𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒕𝑹𝒊)𝑲𝑹𝒊−𝑨𝑪,(H , 𝐍𝑯)_𝑲𝑯−𝑹𝒊) 
 
∀𝒊 ∈ {𝟏, . . ,𝒎}(𝑵𝑹𝒊)_𝑲𝑯−𝑹𝒊 
∀𝒊 ∈ {𝟏, . . ,𝒎}((RS, 𝑵𝑹𝑺, 𝑵𝑯)_𝑲𝑯−𝑹𝒊, MAC) 
∀𝒊 ∈ {𝟏, . . ,𝒎}(𝑹𝒊,𝑪𝒆𝒓𝒕𝑹𝒊,𝑪𝒆𝒓𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝑹𝑺 , 𝑵𝑹𝒊,𝑵𝑹𝑺) 
∀𝒊 ∈ {𝟏, . . ,𝒎}(𝑪𝒆𝒓𝒕𝑹𝑺 ,𝑵𝑹𝒊) 
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insertion of messages by attacker. Through the authentication mechanisms in our protocol that inspired from 
Kerberos protocol [22], the access control server can check identity of each node in 6LoWPAN network. So, 
it is impossible to launch an attack like sinkhole, wormhole and DOS attacks. 
 
3.2 Formal Validation With Avispa Tool 
The AVISPA Tool [23] is a push-button tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security 
Protocols and Applications. It provides a modular and expressive formal language for specifying protocols 
and their security properties, and integrates different back-ends that implement a variety of automatic 
protocol analysis techniques to illustrate whether the candidate protocol is safe or not. The tool provides a 
trace high lighting the steps that have led to the attack. In fact, AVISPA is considered as an effective tool for 
the analysis of different Internet security protocols and applications. In the literature, several security 
protocols have been validated through AVISPA [24], as IKE, TLS, AAA protocols of IETF. The tool 
implements the Dolev-Yao intruder model [25] able to eavesdrop, intercept messages, insert bogus data, or 
modify traffic passing through. AVISPA supports multiple backend model checkers. Some of the important 
back-end tools used by AVISPA are OFMC, Cl-AtSe, SATMC and TA4SP. 
The specification language HLPSL is used to describe the security protocol as sequences of 
exchanged messages between different entities. The action of each entity is organized in a module called 
basic role. However, the interactions of entities are described by composing multiple basic roles together into 
a composed role. In addition, the security goals of the analyzed protocol are specified in the goal section 
before launching the analysis. The formal validation of our protocol was achieved using AVISPA tool to 
prove the non-violation of the required security properties. In our model, we have first defined a basic role to 
describe the actions of the different entities involved. Then, we have described how the participating entities 
interact with each other in a composed role. The results of the simulation show that our protocol is “safe” 
against OFMC (see Figure 5), CL-AtSe (see Figure 6) and SATMC (see Figure 7). However, against TA4SP 
database, the result was ‘‘INCONCLUSIVE’’ (see Figure 8). These reports of each backend model produced 
by AVISPA tool explained that our protocol is safe regarding the specified security goal. It is impossible for 










Figure 6. Back-end AVISPA (CL-AtSe) 
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Figure 8. Back-end AVISPA (TA4SP) 
 
 
In order to determine the performance of our proposed protocol, we compared our key exchange scheme 
against others schemes.  As seen in table 2, one of the major differences between the proposed method and 
other mentioned methods is that we propose an authentication phase  in our protocol without increasing  
computational and storage cost in 6LoWPAN network specially for 6LBR and router (Ri). for example in 
SAKES [26], there is one 6loWPAN router only that participates in key establishement scheme using DH 
(Diffie–Hellman) algorithm. Thus, the storage and computational cost in 6LoWPAN router augmente. Unlike 
SAKES, the proposed model uses the selectioned set of routers based on trust model and employ the 
cryptographic algorithm ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman) that it’s considerable as  lightweight 
algorithm  more than DH for constrained device .  
 Another advantage of the proposed method is the used  of an access control server that ensure 
autorisation and authentication in 6LoWPAN network and decrease the storage cost in 6LBR,  for example in 
[27]-[28] did not proposed the authentication system in 6LoWPAN network. However in SAKES, there is  an 
module in border router that ensure authentication in 6LoWPAN network, but this mecanism increases the 
storage cost in 6LBR Which leads to the network  cannot be easily extend. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Device and network constraints in IoT necessitate the employed protocols to be tailored towards the 
special requirements of IoT network environments, in this paper we presented a key management protocol 
suitable a constraint environments like 6LoWPAN network, this protocol  has established  a shared secret key 
between the 6LowPAN Host and a remote server in IPV6 network. During the executing process of our 
protocol, the constrained node use only symmetric cryptography. Besides, the heavy asymmetric 
cryptography is affected to selected 6LoWPAN routers. 
In addition, authentication system in 6Lowpan is realized by AC server, this later stock all security-
related information about components of 6LoWPAN network. This mechanism mitigate the overhead storage 
of security information in each node. The security properties are satisfied in our protocol. The future work 
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